Kentucky Court of Appeals
Insurance – UM - Hit and Run
Reynolds v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Illinois, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2010 WL 3603982 (Ky.App. September 17, 2010), affirmed August 23, 2012 (2010-SC-000665-DG). Supreme Court Case Report

The plaintiff was injured when a piece of ice dislodged from a tractor trailer on the highway, and sought recovery under her UM coverage. This argument follows logically from the case of Baldwin v. Doe, 2010 WL 392343 (Ky.App. February 5, 2010), which we discussed in February. In Baldwin, a tarp came off of a truck and a panel of the Court of Appeals held that this “indirect” contact satisfied the UM policy definition. It is hard to see a material distinction between a tarp and a piece of ice, but the Reynolds majority declined to extend UM coverage because the ice was not intentionally affixed to the truck. In a concurring opinion, Judge Acree observed that there is nothing in the policy to suggest that the method of affixation of an object has anything to do with coverage. This issue is clearly headed for the Supreme Court, and should be clarified soon. Judge Acree is correct that the “indirect” contact theory should be limited to a chain reaction involving vehicles, not vehicle parts, but it remains to be seen whether the Supreme Court can resist the temptation to expand coverage beyond the intent of the parties.

Kentucky Court of Appeals - Unpublished
Insurance – Claims Made – Continuous Coverage
AIG Domestic Claims, Inc. v. Tussey, 2010 WL 3603844 (Ky.App. September 17, 2010), motion for discretionary review granted September 14, 2011 (2010-SC-827-DG) but dismissed by agreement as settled.

The Pike County Board of Education had a claims made policy in effect July 1, 2005 to July 1, 2006, and the policy was renewed for the period July 1, 2006 to July 1, 2007. On February 20, 2006, Tussey filed a complaint alleging discrimination based on sex. The claim was not reported until the second policy period. The language of the policy clearly did not give rise to coverage. In a split decision, the Court essentially treated the two policies as one, and held that reporting the claim in policy period two was the same as reporting it is policy period number one. The opinion attempts to justify this with a sophomoric “construction” of the discovery period language, but the reality is the Court just rewrote the policy (and in effect facilitated a wealth transfer) simply because the Court thought that it was fair to do so. The Court suggests that without its intervention there would be no coverage, but all the insured had to do is timely report the claim. These days, apparently, that is too much to ask.

Kentucky Court of Appeals
Insurance – No-Fault – Standing of Providors
Eriksen v. Kentucky Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company, 336 S.W.3d 909, 2010 WL 3447688 (Ky.App. September 4, 2010)

A no-fault insurer filed suit for recovery of a $425.00 overpayment from a physician, who then counterclaimed for interest on late payments. The Court rejected the physician’s attempt to distinguish a claim for interest from a claim for payment under an assignment, which are unenforceable in the context of no-fault benefits. It is hard to see how anyone was a winner in this one.